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The Livingston Survey:
Still Useful After All These Years
Dean Croushore*
The decisions of households, firms, and gov-
ernment agencies depend on forecasts of the
overall economy. Households face decisions
such as whether to refinance a mortgage,
whether to buy or lease a car, how to invest their
savings, how to plan for retirement, and how
to save for their children’s college education,
all of which depend on the future movements
of macroeconomic variables like interest rates,
output, the stock market, and inflation. Those
same macroeconomic variables influence the
decisions of business firms about what equip-
ment to buy, how to market a product, how to
invest excess funds, and how to borrow to meet
liquidity needs. Government policymakers
need good forecasts to calculate the costs and
benefits of spending programs and to estimate
tax revenues.
Households, firms, and governments can get
macroeconomic forecasts in many different
ways. Large firms and the federal government
may have the resources to hire their own econo-
mists to provide forecasts. Some organizations
may hire a consulting firm to forecast for them.
But for smaller firms, households, and local
governments, for which such an expense
*Dean Croushore is an assistant vice president and
economist and head of the Macroeconomics section of the
Philadelphia Fed’s Research Department.
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wouldn’t be worthwhile, are there any alterna-
tives?
One alternative is to subscribe to a survey of
forecasters, such as the Livingston Survey,
which, after 50 years, still provides useful fore-
casts of the economy.
THE SURVEY’S HISTORY
In 1946, Joseph A. Livingston, then a colum-
nist for the Philadelphia Record, began asking
business economists he knew to provide him
with their forecasts for important economic
variables. He followed through with the sur-
vey every six months, in June and December,
even when he moved from the Record to the
Bulletin in 1948 and to the Philadelphia Inquirer
in 1972. Livingston wrote a lively (at least by
economists’ standards!) column about the re-
sults, and his survey gained a national follow-
ing.
The survey had been around for a long time
before economists discovered its value in the
1970s. The rise of inflation in that decade led to
the formulation of a new economic theory
known as rational expectations. The theory sug-
gests that people who forecast will use all avail-
able, relevant information. Doing so implies
that their forecasts won’t be systematically bi-
ased (that is, forecast errors will be random and
won’t have any obvious pattern to them). As
economists began seeking ways to test the ra-
tional expectations theory, they turned to the
Livingston Survey, which was the only good
collection of forecasts of macroeconomic vari-
ables.
Livingston received many requests from
economists for his survey data — so many that,
in 1978, he turned to the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia for help. The Philadelphia Fed
entered the survey data into a computer data-
base and made the data available to research-
ers in an organized fashion.
In 1985, the Philadelphia Fed and Livingston,
acknowledging the value of continuing the sur-
vey perpetually, agreed that if Livingston no
longer wanted to continue the survey, or was
unable to do so, the Fed would take over. So
when Livingston died in 1989, the Philadelphia
Fed took over the survey.
In a 1992 issue of this Business Review, Herb
Taylor provided a more complete history of the
survey and how Livingston wrote about it. This
article will focus more on the details of the sur-
vey and its value in research.
HOW THE SURVEY WORKS
Every June and December, the Livingston
Survey asks participants to forecast a set of key
macroeconomic variables, including real and
nominal GDP (gross domestic product, which
is the best overall measure of our economy’s
total production), inflation (both the producer
price index and the consumer price index), the
unemployment rate, the three-month Treasury-
bill interest rate, the interest rate on 30-year
Treasury bonds, and the S&P 500 stock index.
In addition, the survey covers a variety of other
variables: real nonresidential fixed investment,
corporate profits after taxes, industrial produc-
tion, total private housing starts, average
weekly earnings in manufacturing, retail trade,
auto sales, and the prime interest rate.
Survey participants are asked to provide
forecasts for these variables for the end of the
current month, six months ahead, and 12
months ahead. They also provide forecasts for
the current calendar year, the following calen-
dar year, and (in the December survey only) the
calendar year after next. In 1991, the survey
added a new question, which asked for 10-year
forecasts for real GDP and consumer price in-
flation.
The timing of the survey is crucial, since the
information available to forecasters affects what
their forecasts will be. Because of the impor-
tance of forecasts of consumer price inflation,
the survey is mailed to participants in May and
November, immediately following the
government’s release of the consumer price in-
dex (CPI) for the preceding month. The Fed re-
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quests that the survey be returned before the
next release of the CPI in June and December.
Who are the forecasters? Because of his work
as a journalist, Livingston was well known in
the business economics community. He polled
economists with whom he
had discussed issues for
stories he was writing, in-
cluding many economists
on Wall Street, in corpora-
tions, and at forecasting
firms, as well as private
consultants. He also devel-
oped contacts with econo-
mists in academia who
were interested in macro-
economic forecasting. The
Philadelphia Fed continues
the tradition of seeking a
wide variety of partici-
pants. Currently, about 30
percent of the forecasters
come from nonfinancial
businesses (for example, a
number are chief economists of corporations),
29 percent are from investment banking firms
(many on Wall Street), 20 percent represent com-
mercial banks around the country, 13 percent
work in academic institutions, and the remain-
ing 8 percent come from labor organizations,
government, and insurance companies.
The number of participants in the survey has
been fairly steady over time, averaging about
50 forecasters in each survey. Currently, about
90 participants are on the mailing list, and 55
to 65 return the survey each time.
An important issue in surveys like the
Livingston is how to get people to provide their
true forecasts. After all, the participants aren’t
paid; their only reward is that they receive the
survey on a regular basis and see their name
on the list of participants. However, the survey
does not reveal which individual made which
forecasts. If it did, some participants might
shade their forecasts more toward the consen-
sus (to avoid unfavorable publicity when
wrong), while others might make unusually
bold forecasts, hoping to stand out from the
crowd. To prevent these publicity effects, the
survey provides a list of the participants but
doesn’t tell who provided
which forecast.
The results of the
Livingston Survey are re-
leased to the press near the
end of June and December
each year. Staff members in
the Research and Statistics
Department at the Phila-
delphia Fed prepare a press
release and tables of the
survey results, which are
released on a public-rela-
tions news service. Stories
about the survey appear in
many major newspapers
and on Wall Street
newswires. Staff members
also report the results in
on-camera or telephone interviews. The results
are also made available via the Internet on the
Philadelphia Fed’s Web page (http://
www.phil.frb.org).
IMPORTANCE OF THE LIVINGSTON
SURVEY IN ECONOMIC RESEARCH
The Livingston Survey would not have sur-
vived the past 50 years had it not been of value
to someone. Joseph Livingston used it as the
basis for two newspaper columns each year. But
its more enduring legacy is the research done
by academic economists, who have used and
tested the survey forecasts in many different
ways to examine hypotheses about expecta-
tions. (For a synopsis of current research on
expectations in economics presented at a recent
conference, see Conference on Expectations in Eco-
nomics: In Honor of the 50th Anniversary of the
Livingston Survey.)
The first question one might ask is: how good
The Livingston
Survey would not
have survived the
past 50 years had
it not been of
value to someone.
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CONFERENCE ON EXPECTATIONS IN ECONOMICS:
In Honor of the 50th Anniversary of the Livingston Survey
The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and the University of Pennsylvania jointly sponsored a
conference in October 1996 on “Expectations in Economics: In Honor of the 50th Anniversary of the
Livingston Survey.” Seven new papers showed that research about expectations is still active and
making new discoveries.
Robert Shiller of Yale University presented “Why Do People Dislike Inflation?”  In the paper, Shiller
reports the results of a survey that asks people what it is about inflation that causes problems for
them, and how they rank inflation’s importance compared with other problems they face. Shiller
compares the results of surveys taken in the United States to those taken in Germany and Brazil.
Charles Manski of the University of Wisconsin presented his joint work with Jeff Dominitz, “Per-
ceptions of Economic Insecurity: Evidence from the Survey of Economic Expectations.” The authors
report the results of a new survey that asks people about their susceptibility to the loss of health
insurance, burglary, and job loss. They compare people’s perceptions of the likelihood of these events
to data on how often the events actually occur and find that people perceive their risk of loss due to
crime to be much higher than it really is.
Garey Ramey of the University of California at San Diego discussed his joint work with George
Evans, “Calculation, Adaptation, and Rational Expectations.” The paper shows how intensely people
calculate things based on their estimates of benefits compared with costs.  It may not be worthwhile
for people to spend time and effort gathering all the information possible before reaching a decision.
The authors use numerical illustrations to demonstrate the theoretical work.
Stephen McNees, an economic consultant formerly at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, tests
probability forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters in his paper “Forecast Uncertainty:
Can It Be Measured?” McNees examines whether the probabilities reported by the survey partici-
pants are accurate. If the participants say there’s an 80 percent chance that real GDP will grow be-
tween 1 and 3 percent over the next year, does real GDP actually fall into that range 80 percent of the
time? McNees finds that, on average, the probabilities are accurate, though not for all the participants
in the survey.
In their paper “Measuring Predictability: Theory and Macroeconomic Applications,” Lutz Kilian
of the University of Michigan and Frank Diebold of the University of Pennsylvania reported on the
predictability of different macroeconomic variables. The paper begins by creating a general measure
of a variable’s predictability. The authors show how to estimate predictability from sample time-
series data and apply it to U.S. data.
Carl Bonham of the University of Hawaii presented his work (with Richard Cohen) “Heteroge-
neous Expectations: Aggregation Bias and the Poolability of Survey Forecasts in Tests of the Rational
Expectations Hypothesis.” The paper makes clear the relationship between forecasts made by indi-
viduals and the average across those forecasts in tests of rational expectations. They examine fore-
casts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
Owen Lamont from the University of Chicago asserts that older economists make bolder forecasts.
In his paper “Macroeconomic Forecasts and Microeconomic Forecasters,” he studies forecasts from
Business Week and shows that economists attempt to position their forecasts to manipulate beliefs
about the economists’ ability. As economists become older and more established, they produce more
radical forecasts, which are less accurate.
These papers show that economists are actively engaged in research on expectations.  Surveys like
the Livingston Survey continue to provide useful data for testing economic theories.
Copies can be obtained by writing to the authors of the papers.
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are the Livingston forecasts? If a household,
firm, or government based its planning on the
survey, how would it make out? As we’ll see,
these questions have been answered in differ-
ent ways as the survey has been tested in re-
search. But it’s best to begin by looking at what
economists were thinking when they first be-
gan to investigate the survey.
In the 1960s and 1970s, macroeconomics was
dominated by the theories of John Maynard
Keynes. Keynesians said that rigid prices and
wages were important aspects of the
macroeconomy. Adverse shocks to the economy
could lead to recessions because prices and
wages would not adjust immediately. The
theory implied that the government could
eliminate business cycles by using appropriate
fiscal and monetary policies. The Keynesian
models of the era were based on adaptive ex-
pectations — they assumed that people’s ex-
pectations of future inflation were just projec-
tions of past inflation.
In contrast, rational expectations theory sug-
gested that people would use all the informa-
tion available to them in forming forecasts. The
idea of rational expectations originated with
John F. Muth in 1961, but the theory took off in
the second half of the 1970s with the publica-
tion of key papers by Robert Lucas, by Lucas
and Thomas Sargent, and by Sargent and Neil
Wallace.
Rational expectations theory showed how
the Keynesian models were flawed by their fail-
ure to deal adequately with expectations. Ac-
cording to this theory, people can make better
forecasts by using more information. For ex-
ample, if people observe the money supply in-
creasing more rapidly than before, they’ll in-
crease their forecasts of inflation because they
know that faster money growth leads to higher
inflation.
The theory of rational expectations was im-
portant because it provided a reasonable expla-
nation of the failure of the Phillips curve in the
1970s. The Phillips curve showed a tradeoff
between inflation and unemployment that
Keynesian economists believed to be stable.  If
inflation rose, unemployment would fall, and
vice versa. In the mid-1970s, a deep recession
was accompanied by rising inflation — an im-
possibility according to the Phillips curve
model.  Rational expectations theory showed
how inflation and unemployment could rise
together when people began to expect higher
rates of inflation.
The theory of rational expectations doesn’t
say that everybody should be a great forecaster
— only people whose forecasts matter to their
livelihoods. An engineer doesn’t spend much
time forecasting inflation because her job
doesn’t depend on it. But a Wall Street money
manager may spend a lot of time and energy
forecasting inflation because the returns on her
portfolio depend a lot on what happens to in-
flation. So the money manager will spend a lot
more time trying to understand the economy
and reading through the details of economic
reports than will the engineer.
How Can the Theory of Rational Expecta-
tions Be Tested?  How do we know if people
are forming their expectations rationally? One
way is to look at people’s forecasts and see if
they’re any good. But what constitutes a good
forecast? That question has been answered in a
number of different ways using the Livingston
Survey.
If people have rational expectations, they
shouldn’t make systematic errors in producing
their forecasts. If their errors had a recogniz-
able pattern, the forecasters would modify their
methods.
There are two obvious ways in which people
could make systematic errors. One is that, over
long periods of time, their forecast errors might
not average out to zero. But if so, the forecast
errors could be reduced by subtracting out the
average error from the forecasts. This idea sug-
gests some straightforward tests for the qual-
ity of forecasts. A simple test is to calculate the
average forecast error and see if it’s close to zero.
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A more sophisticated test is to plot the ac-
tual value of the variable against the forecast.
If the forecast is unbiased, the plot should be
centered on a 45-degree line through the ori-
gin. That would mean that, on average, the fore-
casts were randomly distributed around the
actual values. One can also use the statistical
tool of econometrics to investigate how close
those points are to the 45-degree line.  Using
linear regression analysis, an analyst can see if
the best-fitting line through the plot of the ac-
tual values against the forecasts is significantly
different from the 45-degree line. If it is, the fore-
casts are said to be biased; if not, the forecasts
are unbiased.
Forecasters make a second type of system-
atic error: they fail to use all available informa-
tion when forming their forecasts.  If forecast-
ers ignore some relevant piece of data, their fore-
cast errors will be systematically related to that
data. An econometric test examines whether the
forecast errors are related to data that forecast-
ers had available. If there’s no such relationship,
the forecasts are said to be efficient. If there is a
statistically significant relationship, the fore-
casts are inefficient. For more technical details
on these tests, see the Appendix.
Early Tests of Rational Expectations of In-
flation. Inflation is the most important macro-
economic variable for testing rational expecta-
tions because Lucas and Sargent suggested that
errors in forming expectations of inflation are
the key to understanding the business cycle.
The first article to analyze the Livingston
Survey’s inflation forecasts was written in 1970
by Stephen Turnovsky. Ahead of his time,
Turnovsky performed the first bias tests on the
Livingston Survey data. Looking at data from
1954 to 1969, he found that inflation forecast
errors were large in the late 1950s, but much
smaller in the 1960s. When Turnovsky ran the
econometric tests for bias (described in the Ap-
pendix), he found that, on average, inflation
was forecast about 1 percentage point too low
from 1954 to 1964. But he found no bias from
1962 to 1969. He suggested that something
changed around 1960 to improve the inflation
forecasts. Perhaps people didn’t have much in-
centive to forecast inflation well before then,
since inflation was low on average.
In a 1975 article, James Pesando evaluated
the Livingston forecasts and found them to be
biased in a certain way. Pesando used the data
from 1959 to 1969 and showed that the 12-
month-ahead forecasts weren’t consistent with
the six-month-ahead forecasts. When he ran
bias tests as Turnovsky did, he found the six-
month-ahead forecasts weren’t biased, but the
12-month-ahead forecasts were. Pesando was
the first person to suggest that perhaps the
Livingston Survey wasn’t representative of
people’s true forecasts. If the survey did repre-
sent true forecasts, people weren’t rational, ac-
cording to his statistical tests. And that’s hard
to believe because people would lose money in
financial markets if they weren’t rational.
It turned out that both Turnovsky and
Pesando had used the Livingston Survey results
as Livingston had published them in his news-
paper column. But John Carlson of Purdue
University found two serious problems with the
data, as he reported in his 1977 study. First,
Livingston didn’t report the data quite as his
respondents sent them in. In particular, if re-
vised data came in between the time at which
people made their forecast and when his col-
umn was published, Livingston modified the
forecasts he reported. This was a pragmatic way
for a journalist to deal with the problem of re-
vised data, but it caused many problems for
economists. So Carlson was able to get the origi-
nal data from Livingston and handle it prop-
erly for statistical testing.
Carlson also pointed out that although
people were treating the forecasts as covering
six-month and 12-month periods, that wasn’t
accurate. For example, when the questionnaires
were mailed out for the December survey, re-
spondents knew only the October consumer
price index (most of the time). But they were
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asked to forecast the index for the following
June and December, so their forecasts were re-
ally for eight months (October to June) and 14
months (October to the following December).
This methodological flaw in the survey cre-
ated problems for researchers, especially since,
at times, some forecasters knew only the Octo-
ber index when they made their forecasts, while
others knew the November index. Prior to 1969,
the CPI was released even later, so the forecast-
ers may have had even less information when
sending in their forecasts. This makes testing
for rational expectations tricky. The flaw was
finally corrected in 1992 after the Philadelphia
Fed had run the survey for several years. The
solution was simple: ask forecasters to forecast
the current December value for the index (as
well as June and the following December), so
that there are definite six- and 12-month fore-
casts. Also, the timing of the survey was tight-
ened to ensure that all responses to the survey
were received before the CPI for May or No-
vember was released; this ensured that, for con-
sumer price inflation at least, all forecasters had
the same data.
When Carlson used corrected data and re-
ran Pesando’s tests, he found that the inflation
forecasts were even worse. But Pesando’s pro-
cedure had made a very strong assumption
about how inflation behaved over time.1
Carlson allowed the inflation process to change
over time and compared a statistical forecast
with the Livingston Survey forecasts. He found
that the survey forecasts were generally better
than the statistical forecasts. While this fact
underlines the value of the survey, Carlson also
noted the very large forecast errors in the early
1970s, a time when inflation rose to much higher
levels than anticipated.
Key Rationality Tests.  The next important
paper in this literature came in 1978 from Don
Mullineaux, then at the Philadelphia Fed.
Mullineaux argued that Pesando’s test (the one
replicated by Carlson using the corrected data)
was statistically flawed. He tried a closely re-
lated (but statistically correct) test and found
no irrationality in the Livingston Survey fore-
casts.
Mullineaux’s results in support of the
survey’s forecasts were almost immediately
challenged by Douglas Pearce in 1979, who,
using a different methodology, found that in-
flation forecasts were biased. Pesando, Carlson,
and Mullineaux all assumed that inflation fol-
lowed a particular statistical process. But a look
at the data suggests that inflation follows a very
different process.2 And when Pearce generated
statistical forecasts using this alternative pro-
cess, they were much better than the Livingston
Survey forecasts. Thus, the Livingston forecasts
weren’t efficient because they didn’t use infor-
mation on past inflation to form better forecasts.
Pearce struck a strong blow against the accu-
racy of the Livingston Survey forecasts of in-
flation.
Some of the issues in the literature on ratio-
nal expectations are fairly technical and thus
impossible to discuss in a survey article like this
one. But one technical issue turns out to be vi-
tally important in carrying out the tests de-
scribed above. Economists call it the problem
of overlapping observations. Suppose in June
and December 1994 you made forecasts for the
next year. That is, in June 1994 you made a pre-
diction for the consumer price index from June
1994 to June 1995, and in December 1994 you
made a forecast from December 1994 to Decem-
ber 1995. Notice that the time periods of the two
1Pesando assumed that inflation was related to past in-
flation in a fixed pattern for the preceding five periods (each
period is a half year). In technical terms, Pesando assumed
that inflation was a five-period autoregressive process.
2The assumption was that inflation followed what is
known as an autoregressive process, but Pearce’s estimates
suggested that a moving-average process represents the
data better. The difference is important both theoretically
and in practice.
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forecasts overlap somewhat — both include the
period from December 1994 to June 1995.
Now suppose some disaster had struck the
economy during that overlapping period.  For
example, suppose that OPEC tripled oil prices
in March 1995. Then it’s likely that consumer
inflation would have risen sharply in March
1995, and your forecasts for both June 1994 to
June 1995 and December 1994 to December 1995
would be far too low. This is the overlapping
observations problem: a shock to the variable
being forecast affects the forecast errors for sev-
eral forecasts, not just one. This leads to prob-
lems in interpreting both plots of the data and
econometric tests for bias and efficiency.3  Bryan
Brown and Shlomo Maital, in a 1981 article,
showed how to deal with this problem using a
sophisticated statistical procedure.  They illus-
trated their results with the Livingston Survey,
testing forecasts for inflation and several other
variables. They found the Livingston Survey
forecasts to be largely free of bias. They did find,
however, that the forecasts are a bit inefficient;
they don’t use information about monetary
policy (the growth rate of the money supply)
to form better forecasts.
In a 1981 article, Stephen Figlewski and Paul
Wachtel suggested that rationality tests should
be performed on individual forecasts, not the
average across individuals, which had been
used by previous researchers. Using the aver-
age across forecasters could lead to an error in
evaluating whether individual forecasters have
rational expectations; it’s possible that the in-
dividual forecasters could have rational expec-
tations, but the average across forecasters
would be biased, or vice versa. When Figlewski
and Wachtel looked at the individual forecast
data from the participants in the survey, they
found overwhelming evidence that the fore-
casts were biased and inefficient.
Many other papers found fault with the
Livingston inflation forecasts. One of the more
devastating notions was that simple models
could do better than the Livingston Survey, as
Pearce had found. In a notable 1984 paper, Eu-
gene Fama and Michael Gibbons showed that
simple models using interest rates could fore-
cast inflation better than the Livingston Survey.
They implied that because interest rates are
formed in financial markets, they provide a
better measure of expected inflation than the
survey, which questions people who may not
have a strong incentive to forecast well. As
Frederic Mishkin put it in 1981, “One obvious
danger with survey data is that there may be
very little incentive for the respondents to an-
swer accurately.”
But recently, both the Livingston and other
survey forecasts are being used more and more
in the popular press and by researchers.4 One
reason is the realization that the negative re-
sults on the Livingston forecasts came during
the 1970s and early 1980s, when inflation was
very erratic because of oil-price shocks. For that
period, the forecasts look bad and seem to be
biased or inefficient. Since that time, however,
inflation has become much more predictable.
Rerunning the same tests for rationality (using
the average across forecasters) as before leads
to a much more favorable view of the
Livingston forecasts, as I showed in a 1996 ar-
ticle.
Testing Other Forecast Variables. Though
testing the inflation forecasts from the
Livingston Survey has been its most important
use, other variables in the survey have also been
examined, including the stock market and real
output.
4See Comparison to Other Surveys for a discussion of some
of the other forecasting surveys and how they differ from
the Livingston.
3The problems arise because a shock, such as the oil-
price shock in the example, that occurs in the overlapping
period gives rise to forecast errors that are related to each
other. But any relationship between forecast errors violates
the assumptions needed to run the econometric tests for
bias and efficiency described in the Appendix.
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The Livingston Survey’s stock market fore-
casts have been examined in a number of ar-
ticles. In 1980, Josef Lakonishok found that the
forecasts (averaged across the forecasters) were
biased and inefficient. In 1984, Douglas Pearce
confirmed those results using the individual
forecast data. But in 1989, Yoon Dokko and
Robert Edelstein reached a contrary conclusion.
They claimed that both earlier studies had mis-
calculated the expected returns to the stock
market because survey participants had not
provided a forecast for the current June or De-
cember value for the stock market index. For
example, previous researchers assumed that in
the June survey, forecasts were made on a par-
ticular day, but we know that, in fact, different
participants sent in their forecasts on different
days. Since day-to-day movements of the stock
market may be large, each survey participant
was basing his or her forecast on a different base
for the stock index.
To avoid this problem, Dokko and Edelstein
used just the information on expected growth
between the forecast of the stock market for the
end of June and the end of December, which
gives an exact six-month expected return, with
no question about the forecast’s horizon.  When
Dokko and Edelstein ran tests on their data,
they found no bias or inefficiency in the
Livingston forecasts. These findings suggest
that the results of all these statistical tests are
very sensitive to researchers’ assumptions.
In a recent paper I’ve written with Laurence
Ball of Johns Hopkins University, we examined
the real GDP forecasts (as well as the inflation
forecasts) from the Livingston Survey and how
Comparison to Other Surveys
The Livingston Survey isn’t the only survey of macroeconomic forecasts available, though it is the
granddaddy of them all. Interest in the Livingston Survey led to the formation of many other surveys.
The ASA/NBER Business Outlook Survey, now known as the Survey of Professional Forecasters,
started in 1968 as a joint venture of the American Statistical Association (ASA) and the National Bu-
reau of Economic Research (NBER). University of Chicago professor Victor Zarnowitz was instru-
mental in getting the survey started in the fourth quarter of 1968.  The survey was taken around the
middle of each quarter and provided more detailed forecasts than the Livingston Survey. Participants
were asked to provide forecasts for the current quarter, and one, two, three, and four quarters ahead,
for many major macroeconomic variables. In 1981, the survey was extended to include all the compo-
nents of real GNP.  Unique to the survey is a set of questions about the probabilities that forecasters
attach to different changes in GNP (GDP since 1992) and the price level. The Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia took over the survey in 1990. For further information, see my 1993 article.
In 1976, Robert Eggert discovered that interest in forecasts was so great that people wanted a more
frequent survey of forecasts. His Blue Chip Economic Indicators has been a big success, and much
research has been based on this survey. It has the advantage of being monthly, thus providing a lot
more information than the Livingston Survey. But since it hasn’t been around as long, researchers
who need a longer time series can’t use it. Nonetheless, many of the tests for bias and efficiency
carried out on the Livingston Survey have also been done on the Blue Chip survey, with similarly
mixed results.
The National Association of Business Economists (NABE) produces a survey of its members every
quarter. It consists of annual forecasts for many macroeconomic variables and asks a variety of topical
questions. The survey has been going on since the early 1960s and NABE maintains a database of the
results.
Business publications such as the Wall Street Journal and Business Week also collect surveys of econo-
mists, although researchers are just now beginning to study their results.
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they are influenced by monetary policy. While
our results suggested that the survey forecasts
were unbiased, they also indicated that the fore-
casts weren’t efficient with respect to monetary
policy. That is, the forecasters didn’t fully use
the information they had about monetary policy
to form better forecasts. Instead, they seem to
make small but systematic errors. When mon-
etary policy changes: (1) they don’t forecast a
large enough change in output; and (2) they
assume that inflation will respond to the change
faster than it actually does. The results suggest
that the forecasters may not have rational ex-
pectations. But other explanations for the fore-
cast errors are also reasonable, such as the fact
that changes in the financial structure of the
economy have led to confusion about which
variable accurately measures monetary policy.
Other Uses of the Livingston Survey. All of
the studies discussed above tested the quality
of the Livingston Survey’s forecasts, especially
to see if they were consistent with rational ex-
pectations theory. However, the survey has been
used to test other economic theories. The fore-
casts have been used to study the relationship
between nominal and real interest rates, to test
the response of stock market forecasts to higher
expected inflation, and to test theories of con-
sumption spending.
The Fisher effect (named after economist Irv-
ing Fisher) describes the relationship between
nominal and real interest rates. The nominal
interest rate consists of two components:  the
real interest rate plus the expected rate of infla-
tion. According to the theory of the Fisher ef-
fect, when the expected inflation rate rises one
percentage point, the nominal interest rate
should rise proportionally. This theory has been
tested using the Livingston series on expected
inflation. In 1972, William Gibson showed that
a one-percentage-point increase in expected
inflation would raise interest rates on bonds
with maturities of a year or less about one per-
centage point, confirming the Fisher effect. But
Gibson’s study was flawed because it was based
on the data before Carlson’s corrections were
made, so Vito Tanzi redid Gibson’s work with
the corrected data. Tanzi’s work did not sup-
port Gibson’s results; he found that nominal
interest rates don’t rise one-for-one with ex-
pected inflation. Rather, both the state of the
business cycle and the tax rate influenced the
relationship between the nominal interest rate
and the expected inflation rate.
In a 1983 study, N. Bulent Gultekin, using
the Livingston Survey expectations of both in-
flation and stock returns, found that expected
stock returns rose point-for-point with rises in
expected inflation.  Economic theory predicts
this result, but previous empirical research,
which hadn’t used the Livingston forecasts,
didn’t support the theory.
Finally, a very influential paper in macroeco-
nomics used the Livingston Survey to test the
theory that people change the timing of their
consumption expenditures depending on
changes in interest rates.  Robert Hall used the
survey to represent the expected real returns to
stocks and to short-term Treasury securities.
Hall’s results surprised many economists be-
cause they suggested that consumption spend-
ing didn’t respond much to changes in expected
real interest rates. Previous studies had reached
the opposite conclusion.
SUMMARY
The Livingston Survey has proven to be a
valuable tool for measuring economists’ fore-
casts of macroeconomic variables over the past
50 years. It was instrumental in testing the
theory of rational expectations in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. While the survey’s inflation
forecasts seemed to fail the tests of rational ex-
pectations 15 to 20 years ago, more recent tests
show that the forecasts are much better, though
perhaps not perfect. The survey has also been
used to test the rationality of forecasts of other
variables and to test theories of interest rates,
stock returns, and consumption spending.
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APPENDIX
Testing for Bias and Efficiency
A number of different tests have been used in the literature on bias and efficiency.  The most well known
are fairly simple and are described in this appendix. For more complicated tests, the reader can refer to the
research studies described earlier in this article.
Given a set of forecasts, Ft, for a variable Xt, a simple bias test involves running the regression Xt =  α+
ß Ft + εt.  If the estimated value of α is 0 and the estimated value of ß is 1, the forecasts are unbiased. Formal
statistical tests can be performed to see if the estimated value of α is close enough to 0 and the estimated
value of ß is close enough to 1 to consider the forecasts to be unbiased.
An efficiency test requires determining if the forecast errors (Xt - Ft ) are systematically related to some
other variable that was known to the forecaster when the forecasts were made.  Suppose this other variable
is denoted Zt. Then the efficiency test requires running a regression of the form Xt - Ft  = γ + δ Zt + υ t. If the
estimated value of δ is significantly different from 0, the forecasts are inefficient. It should be possible to use
the existing forecasts with the information about  Zt  to form a better forecast.
Bias and inefficiency are different concepts, so forecasts can be biased but efficient or they can be unbi-
ased but inefficient.
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a decline in inflation over the
next year.  Consumer price in-
flation as measured by the
Consumer Price Index is ex-
pected to be 3.1 percent in the
first half of 1997.  Economists
forecast a moderate drop in
inflation, to 2.9 percent, in the
second half.
The forecast for inflation
over the next 10 years fell to 3.0
percent, a 0.1 percent decrease
from the forecast in the last
survey.
The Producer Price Index
(PPI) also shows little change
in inflation.  Economists fore-
cast that the PPI growth rate
will be 2.4 percent in both the
first and second halves of 1997.
Wage growth is expected to
rise
Wages stay in line with the
inflation rate—3.1 percent—
for the first half of the year.  But
in the second half of 1997,
wage growth is expected to
increase to a rate of 3.3 percent,
December 1996
Economy is holding steady
The 52 forecasters in the
semi-annual Livingston Sur-
vey forecast a  growth rate of
2.3 percent for the economy in
the last quarter of 1996.
Growth for the first half of
1997 is forecast to be 2.0 per-
cent, with a slight increase to
2.3 percent in the second half
of the year.  Average growth for
all of 1997 is forecast to be 2.1
percent.
Unemployment rate
shows little change
Economists forecast little
change in the unemployment
rate over the next year: 5.3 per-
cent in June and 5.4 percent in
December 1997.  Only a mod-
est increase is forecast for 1998
when the unemployment rate
is expected to average 5.6 per-
cent.
Inflation expectations are
revised slightly downward
Survey participants forecast
slightly higher than inflation.
Interest rates change little
     Survey forecasters predict a
slight increase in the U.S. Trea-
sury bond’s interest rate, from
6.6 percent at the end of 1996
to 6.7 percent by the end of
June 1997.  However, they fore-
cast that rates will fall back to
6.6 by the end of 1997 and fall
further, to 6.4 percent, by the
end of 1998.  Forecasts for the
Treasury bill show the same
pattern: 5.1 percent at the end
of 1996, 5.2 percent at the end
of 1997, and 4.9 percent at the
end of 1998.
Stock market will continue to
expand
    Economists forecast contin-
ued expansion in the S&P 500
at a level of 738.5 for the end
of 1996, 750.6 for the end of
1997, and 763.4 for the end of
1998.  This translates into a
growth rate of 1.6 percent for
1997 and 1.7 percent for 1998.
